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Does It Matter Where Immigrants Work? 
Traded Goods, Non-Traded Goods, and Sector Specific Employment 
 
The effects of immigration on an economy is a topic of continuing importance. 
While always a central issue in the US context, immigration has recently also become 
central in the European Union (EU) context: the expectation of potentially large flows of 
workers from East European accession countries raised sufficient fears about adverse labor 
market and government budget impacts as to cause the EU-15 to block the acceding 
countries’ workers from their markets for up to 7 years.  Such fears underscore that the 
effects of immigration on an economy are not yet fully understood. As Table 1 indicates, 
the share of migrants in the total population of most OECD countries, except France and 
Belgium, has been rising.  These trends suggest that understanding the effects of 
immigration on an economy has both increasing importance and relevance. 
Two aspects of immigration have tended to dominate the economics literature: why 
immigration occurs and its effect on domestic factor prices.
1   The cause of immigration is 
usually treated as an analysis of the redistribution of labor supply in response to a wage 
differential.
2  For example, in the well-known Harris-Todaro (1970) model, migration 
occurs if the wage differential between two areas exceeds the expected costs of migration.
3   
The effect of immigration on domestic factor prices, in particular on the wage of 
domestic workers, is usually examined as an exogenous increase in the supply of domestic 
workers.  How this increased supply of labor is predicted to affect wages depends on 
whether one takes a closed or open economy perspective.  In the closed economy (partial 
equilibrium) setting, the common theoretical prediction is that immigration will lower 
(raise) the prices of factors that are close substitutes (complements) but it can have an 
ambiguous effect on the prices of factors that are imperfect substitutes.  However, in an  
  2
open economy (general equilibrium) setting, if goods trade equalizes factor prices between 
countries then an exogenous increase in labor supply has no effect on factor prices.  
Instead, the increased supply of labor is absorbed by a change in the allocation of labor 
across sectors (i.e., the Rybczynksi effect). 
While the migration literature has focused on the causes of immigration and its 
effect on native wages, less emphasis has been given to the effect of immigration on output 
and trade.  In this context, an important question is whether trade and immigration are 
substitutes or complements.  Starting with Mundell (1957), the classic view based on the 
Heckscher-Ohlin (H-O) model is that trade and international factor flows are substitutes; in 
the sense that goods trade replaces international factor flows as a means to bring about an 
equilibrium distribution of production across countries.  As long as goods trade narrows 
any difference in factor prices between countries, trade and factor flows are substitutes.  In 
the limiting case of full factor price equalization between countries, goods trade 
completely obviates factor price differences as a basis for international factor movements.  
In this sense, if an exogenous change results in increased trade (e.g., a reduction in trade 
barriers), and this increase in trade in turn reduces any disparity in factor prices between 
countries, then goods trade and factor movements are substitutes.   
An alternative interpretation for whether trade and factor movements are 
substitutes or complements considers the impact on trade of an exogenous change that 
creates a factor inflow into a country (i.e., a reduction in capital taxation).  If this factor 
inflow leads to reduced (increased) trade then trade and the movement of this factor are 
substitutes (complements). Adopting this interpretation, Markusen (1983) insightfully 
demonstrates, in the standard H-O framework, that complementarity between trade and 
international factor movements can arise in the presence of scale economies or various 
distortions in product or labor markets.
4  However, in all cases, the source of this  
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complementarity is the assumption that the internationally mobile factor is used 
intensively in the receiving country’s export sector.  If this factor were instead intensive in 
a country’s import-competing sector, then a substitute relationship would obtain.  
An important feature of the actual pattern of immigrant employment is that many 
immigrants work in relatively low-skilled service sector occupations (e.g., hotels, 
restaurants, domestic helpers, etc.) and are thus to a large extent employed in sectors 
whose output is not internationally traded.  For example, the March 2002 Current 
Population Survey reported that “...19 million of the 135 million employed U.S. workers 
were foreign-born.  Foreign-born workers were significantly less likely to be in managerial 
and technical occupations, and more likely to be in farming and service occupations.  
These occupation gaps were most pronounced for foreign-born workers who arrived since 
1990.”
5   Similarly, the OECD (2004, pp. 55) notes the sector concentration of immigrant 
employment in OECD countries: “Foreigners are generally over-represented in 
construction, hospitality and catering, as well as in household services; that is, the 
proportion of foreigners working in these sectors is higher than their share of total 
employment.”   Lastly, even sociologists contend that because low-skilled manufacturing 
jobs have largely evaporated, at least in the US, much of the low-wage job growth has 
been in areas such  as domestic help.
6   Figure  1 provides graphic evidence of the 
employment concentration of non-native workers in services for several OECD countries. 
As can be seen, the fraction of non-native workers employed in service sectors is greater 
than 50% in all countries except Germany.
7 
In addition to immigrant employment being skewed toward sectors that produce 
non-traded goods, factors such as language barriers, low skill levels, and the often illegal 
status of immigrants suggests that some immigrants are likely to remain employed in such 
sectors.  In this context, the OECD (2004, p. 64) reports that: “...foreigners are ...over- 
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represented in groups at risk of poor labour market integration ....”  Moreover,  “The extent 
of language ability  ..., the presence of protected jobs and the social capital deficiency 
contribute to additional barriers to foreign workers.  Thus, certain groups of foreign 
workers face serious, lasting challenges for sustainable labour market integration.”   
The observed concentration of immigrant employment in services and the low 
inter-sectoral mobility of some immigrant workers within an economy suggests that one 
can operationally consider many immigrant workers to be a factor that is specific to an 
economy’s non-traded goods sectors.  The implications of this skewed and sector specific 
nature of some immigrant employment for the effect of immigration on an economy’s 
output and trade has been largely neglected in the literature.  
This paper investigates the theoretical  implications of the skewed and sector 
specific nature of some immigrant employment for the output of both non-traded and 
traded goods, and hence also on trade.  We first develop a simple model of a small open 
economy producing two internationally traded goods and one non-traded good.  Domestic 
labor and capital are mobile across all three sectors.  To capture the long-term sector 
specific nature of some immigrant employment, we assume that when labor migrates to the 
country, a fraction of new immigrants become specific to the non-traded goods sector; the 
remaining fraction of new immigrants instead acquire “domestic-worker” status and are 
therefore mobile across all three sectors.  Allowing a given inflow of new immigrants to 
contain a heterogeneous mixture  of workers (i.e., sector specific versus domestically 
mobile) contrasts with prior work that treats all immigrants the same (even if a distinction 
is made between immigrants with different skill levels), in terms of both the sectors where 
immigrants become employed and the nature of that employment. In this respect, our 
model extends, more generally, prior analyses of international factor movements and their 
impact on trade.   
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The focus of our analysis is the effect of immigration on the pattern of output and 
trade.  However, our model also has implications for the effect of output price changes on 
factor prices and in this regard, we also examine the effect of tariff removal on factor 
prices.  Assuming migration flows respond to international wage differentials, this tariff 
analysis provides an indication of how immigration would respond to trade liberalization 
in the framework of our model. 
Having developed a theoretical framework that captures both the sector bias and 
sector specific nature of some immigrant employment, we then empirically examine the 
model’s implications with respect to the effects of immigration on the output of non-traded 
goods (services) and traded goods (exports) in a panel of OECD countries over the period 
from 1980 to 2001.  Our analysis of exports in relation to immigration is intended to 
discern empirically whether trade and immigration are substitutes or complements. 
 
I.  Pertinent Literature 
The theoretical trade literature has long been occupied with the question of whether 
goods trade and international factor movements are substitutes or complements.   General 
analyses of this question in the context of the H-O model include Ethier and Svensson 
(1986), Svensson (1984), Markusen and Svensson (1985), and Wong (1986).  The overall 
conclusion from these works is that trade and factor movements can be complements or 
substitutes, so the issue is largely an empirical question.  
In the context of a specific factors framework, the nature of the relationship 
between goods trade and international factor flows has focused on international capital 
mobility.  In this respect, most analysts adopt the specific factors framework of Jones 
(1971) in which each sector employs a specific factor along with a domestically mobile 
factor.  A recent example is Neary (1995), who develops a two-country, two-sector, three  
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factor model (land, labor, and capital) in which capital is internationally mobile but 
specific to one sector (manufactures).  Labor and land are internationally immobile; land is 
specific to the agriculture sector and labor is domestically mobile across both sectors.  As 
Neary notes, trade and capital flows are substitutes in his model as a consequence of 
assuming that capital is specific to the import-competing sector.  Similarly, trade and 
factor flows were complements in Markusen’s (1983) analysis as a consequence of 
assuming that the internationally mobile factor was specific to the export sector.  Hence, in 
such models, complementarity or substitutability between trade and factor flows derives 
solely from the assumption about which traded goods sector (export or import-competing) 
is intensive in, or exclusively employs, the internationally mobile factor. 
The implications of introducing a non-traded sector in a model with an 
internationally mobile, but sector specific, factor was explored by Jones, Neary, and Ruane 
(1983).
8  The impetus for their model was to explain the possibility of two-way capital 
flows between countries.  Their model contained two sectors: one producing a tradable 
good and the other producing a non-traded good.  Labor is internationally immobile but 
domestically mobile between sectors.  Capital is internationally mobile but specific to each 
sector.  The return to capital is fixed on world markets. As they note, this assumption 
implies that capital in their model can be aggregated into a single Hicksian composite 
factor, and hence that the two types of capital are effectively one homogenous type of 
capital.  Since their model was designed to illustrate conditions under which two-way 
capital movements could arise, they in no way addressed, not did they intend to address,  
the question of whether trade and capital flows were substitutes or complements.  In 
addition, by having a single “tradables” sector, their model could not (by d efinition) 
address, as we do in this paper, questions about the pattern of sectoral output changes 
among traded goods sectors (i.e., export versus import-competing).  
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Given that the prior literature on capital mobility has considered the effect of 
capital mobility on trade when capital is sector specific, it would seem that by renaming 
capital as labor the results obtained from the existing literature would provide a sufficient 
set of theoretical results to make a separate analysis of whether trade and labor flows 
(immigration) are complements or substitutes redundant.  However, such a simple re-
labeling would ignore important characteristics of immigrant employment and thereby also 
ignore the potential implications of these special characteristics.  In particular, as our 
model will demonstrate, a complement (substitute) relationship can arise not just from 
assuming that an internationally mobile factor is specific to a country’s export (import-
competing) sector, but also from the assumption that a given factor inflow consists entirely 
of homogeneous units of that factor.  When a given factor inflow is instead allowed to 
consist of heterogeneous units of an internationally mobile factor, complementarity is no 
longer assured.  To our knowledge, no model of international factor mobility has 
considered the implication of allowing a given factor inflow to consist of heterogeneous 
units.    
As will be demonstrated, trade and immigration can be complements in our model 
even when labor is not the factor used intensively in a country’s export sector.
9  This 
contrasts with prior models that demonstrate complementarity by assuming that the 
internationally mobile is either intensive in, or specific to, the production of a country’s 
export good (e.g., Markusen (1983)).  In this regard, our analysis of immigration flows 
both complements and extends prior analyses of both labor and capital mobility.   
In the specific context of the literature on immigration, our model shares some 
similarities to Djajic’s (1997) intriguing model used to study the effect of illegal 
immigration on wages.  As in our model, his model contains two final goods and one non-
traded good.  However, his non-traded sector produces an intermediate good whereas our  
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non-traded sector produces a final good.   In addition, he assumes that capital, which is 
employed in all three sectors, is internationally mobile.  The intermediate good is used, 
along with capital and skilled labor, to produce one of the two final goods.  In Djajic’s 
model, illegal migrants are specific to the intermediate good sector while skilled labor is 
specific to the one sector that uses the intermediate good.  Effectively, his model can be 
thought to have two traded final goods, one of which employs capital, native unskilled 
labor, sector specific skilled labor and (indirectly) sector specific illegal labor while the 
other good employs capital and native unskilled labor.  While Djajic’s focus was the effect 
of illegal immigration on wages, his analysis did generate results for output changes in 
response to an increase in illegal migrants.  However, he did not indicate which of his two 
traded final goods is exported, so discerning a complement or substitute effect in his model 
is problematic.  If one assumes that the good which employs skilled labor is exported then 
his results appear to suggest complementarity between trade and (illegal) immigration. Of 
course, this conclusion would be reversed if this good were instead assumed to be 
imported.  
In Grether, de Melo, and Muller (2001), a traditional Jones (1971) specification of 
two traded final goods: a factor specific to each sector, and a single domestically mobile 
factor, is combined with a median voter model to explore the political economy of 
immigration in a direct-democracy framework.   They thus study alternative factor price 
outcomes associated with increased immigration under different variants of their basic 
model.  The one variant of potential relevance here is when all immigrants are illegal and 
one good is non-traded.  However, in introducing their non-traded good they retain the two 
good setup, so that one sector produces a composite traded good, as in Jones, Neary, and 
Ruane (1983).  Capital therefore is assumed specific to each sector with labor mobile 
between sectors.  While they do not address the relation between trade and immigration, it  
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is of note that they find that increased immigration leaves households better off in the non-
traded good variant of their model compared to the model in which both goods are traded, 
implying that a clear majority of voters would favor additional illegal immigration.  This 
indicates the possible importance of including non-traded goods when studying the effects 
of immigration. 
Empirical investigations of whether trade and international factor movements are 
complements or substitutes have primarily focused on the Mundell interpretation of this 
relationship.  These therefore investigate whether an increase in trade is associated with a 
reduction in the disparity of factor prices (usually wages) between countries, or whether 
increases in trade are accompanied by reductions in international labor movements. In a 
recent survey, Leibfritz, O’Brien, and Dumont (2003) find a variety of conclusions.  They 
note that while some earlier empirical work offered evidence to suggest factor price 
equalization, and hence a substitute relationship between trade and international factor 
flows, more recent work has not. 
Evidence of a substitute relationship comes from authors such as Straubhaar (1988) 
and Molle (2002) who examine data on intra-EU trade and intra-EU labor flows. 
Straubhaar found a negative correlation between trade and labor movements over the 
period from 1958 to 1980; a period in which trade barriers among EU countries were 
sharply reduced.  He also observed that for a subset of EU countries fulfilling the H-O 
criteria (the northern countries), an expansion of goods trade was not accompanied by 
expanded migration.  Similarly, Molle (2001) analyzed intra-EU trade and labor flows 
over the period 1973-2000 and concluded that migration between EU countries diminished 
as free trade increased. He termed this the “integration effect,” and he argued that there 
was no evidence of a complementary relationship between trade and factor flows.  In fact, 
he went so far as to suggest that within the EU, not only are goods trade and labor  
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movements substitutes, but goods trade and capital movements together are a substitute for 
labor movements.  However, these conclusions were not based on any rigorous analysis of 
the data. 
Evidence of a complementary relationship was offered by Cogneau and Tapinos 
(1995) who examined the relationship between trade and emigration for the specific case 
of Morocco.  Richards (1994), in the context of Latin America, also concluded that trade 
and immigration are complements.  These two studies also incorporated the further 
reasoning that as a country develops more of its citizens can afford to migrate.
10   
Whereas most empirical analyses have only looked at simple correlations between 
trade and labor movements, Wong (1988) estimated export and import functions derived 
from an indirect trade utility function specification for the US economy over the period 
from 1948-1983.  His analysis yielded estimated Rybczynski effects with respect to 
changes in capital and labor.  All estimated effects were positive, indicating that a change 
in either capital or labor would increase both exports and imports, and hence the volume of 
US trade.  In this sense, his results suggest a complementary relationship between US trade 
and the international movement of either capital or labor. 
Indirect evidence for the Mundell type substitute relationship between trade and 
immigration comes from work that examines the effect of labor migration on wages.  A 
example is Hanson and Slaughter (1999) who investigate why increases in the supply of 
foreign-born workers have had minimal impact on the wages of native-born US workers.  
They examine immigration into U.S. states by adopting a H -O framework that treats 
individual states as H-O “countries.” Arguing that an absence of wage effects may reflect 
wage equalization across states, they first test for relative factor price equalization by 
examining if the wages of productivity-equivalent workers are equalized across states.  
They conclude that relative factor price equalization holds and that, consistent with this  
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finding, states absorb changes in regional labor endowments, not through changes in 
wages, but rather through changes in the allocation of employment across sectors.  This 
evidence of a Rybczynksi effect implies that trade and labor flows would be substitutes, at 
least among US states. 
The above review of the literature suggests the following conclusions regarding the 
relationship between trade and immigration (or more generally, international factor 
movements).  Theoretically, trade and international factor flows can be complements or 
substitutes.  Which of these relationships evidences itself depends largely on which traded 
goods sector is assumed to use the internationally mobile factor intensively in production. 
In the case of labor migration, models that consider specific cases such as illegal 
immigration have modeled such migrants as sector specific.  However, such models do not 
embrace the broader nature and characteristics of immigrant employment indicated by the 
data.  Empirically, evidence for the nature of the relationship between trade and 
immigration is mixed.  Many empirical investigations have considered only the case of a 
particular country or of a particular region.  In some cases, the nature of the relationship 
between trade and immigration has been investigated using simple correlation analysis or 
has been based on casual empiricism.  A broader and more rigorous analysis therefore 
seems warranted. 
 
II.  The Model 
We assume a small open economy that produces three goods: an exported good (x), 
an import-competing good (m), and a non-traded good (n).  Below, we will often refer to 
the non-traded good as “services.”  There are three factors of production: capital (k), 
domestic labor (d), and immigrant labor (i).  Capital and domestic labor are freely mobile 
across all three sectors whereas immigrant labor only works in, and is therefore specific to,  
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the non-traded services sector.
11  Given this, the full employment conditions for the model 
can be written: 
(1)  =++ ddxxdmmdnn VaQaQaQ 
(2)  kkxxkmmknn VaQaQaQ =++  
(3)   iinn VaQ =  
where Vz is the fixed domestic supply of factor “z,” Qj is the output in sector “j” and azj 
denotes the input requirement of factor “z" per unit of output in sector “j”.  Writing these 














or more compactly  
(5)  AQ=V. 
The matrix A is commonly called the factor input requirements matrix.   
We assume that production of the export good is capital-intensive, that production 
of the import-competing good is domestic labor-intensive, and that production of the non-
traded good is the most labor intensive in terms of total labor employed per unit of capital.  










As written, the capital-labor ratio in the non-traded good sector appropriately 
measures capital relative to the total labor (domestic plus immigrant) employed in that 
sector.  However, for later results we will also need to make an assumption about the use 
of capital per unit of each type of worker in the non-traded services sector.  In this regard,  
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we assume that the non-traded sector is also the most domestic labor-intensive sector, so 












II.A  The Effect of Immigration on Production and Trade  
To determine the change in outputs, and by extension trade, that will arise from 
immigration we can total differentiate system (4) and solve the resulting system for the 
changes in outputs in terms of t he changes in factor supplies.  Doing this gives the 
following set of comparative static equations in matrix form: 
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To examine the effect of immigration on the pattern of outputs, we assume that a 
given inflow of new migrants contains a heterogeneous mix of foreign workers.  
Specifically, we assume that a fraction l of incoming foreign workers will have domestic 
worker status, and thus be freely mobile across all sectors, while the remaining (1–l) of 
new migrants will instead become specific to the non-traded services sector.
13   An inflow 
of “I” new foreign workers will therefore increase the stock of mobile domestic workers 
by the amount dVd = lI, and increase the stock of sector specific immigrant workers by the 
amount dVi = (1 - l)I.   By inserting these factor supply changes into (8) one obtains the 
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The denominator in expressions (9) and (10) is the determinant of the factor input 
requirements matrix  A  i.e.,  ( ) =- A inkmdxkxdm aaaaa which must be non-zero.  This 
condition is satisfied if the capital-labor ratios in the export and import-competing sectors 
differ (i.e., „ kxdxkmdm aaaa ).  The value of this determinant is negative if, as we assume, 
the export sector is more capital-intensive that the import competing sector (i.e., 
> kxdxkmdm aaaa).  One could instead assume the import-competing sector is more 
capital-intensive than the export sector.  However, our empirical analysis will use data on 
OECD countries and, for most of these countries, it is reasonable to assume that the export 
sector is more capital-intensive than the import-competing sector.  Given this, determining 
the output response in each sector reduces to determining the sign of the numerator in each 
of the above expressions.  
The effect of immigration on the output of the export good is determined by (the 
negative of) the sign of the numerator in (9), which, after considerable re-arrangement, can 














where  () =+ nknindn kaaa and  = mkmdm kaa are respectively the capital-labor ratios in the 
non-traded and import-competing sectors and  () =+ inindn saaa is the initial share of 
sector specific immigrant workers in total non-traded sector employment.   Given this, the 
sign of (12) depends on the relationship among the terms in square brackets.    
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First consider the case where l = 0, so that all new immigrants become specific to 
the non-traded sector.
15  In this case, the sign of the numerator in (12) is determined by the 











By definition,  ( ) 1-= nkndn ksaa is the ratio of capital to domestic labor employed 
in the non-traded sector.  Expression (13) is therefore negative given our assumption that 
the import-competing sector (km) is more capital- domestic labor intensive than the non-
traded sector.  Since (9) is then positive, an inflow of foreign workers that consists entirely 
of workers who become specific to the non-traded sector raises the output of the export 
good.   
For the more general case where 0 < l < 1, so that a new inflow of foreign workers 
contains both sector specific and domestic status workers, the effect on export sector 
output depends, in a complicated way, on the terms in square brackets in expression (12).  
However, insights are possible.  First, we note that the ratio kn/km is less than one given 
our assumption that the import-competing sector is more capital-intensive than the non-
traded sector.  This implies that the expression  ( ) ( ) 1- nm kk  in (12) is positive and less 
than one.  Given this, one can deduce that (12) is unambiguously positive, and hence that 
production of the export good unambiguously falls with immigration, if the employment 
share of sector specific immigrants in the non-traded sector exceeds the fraction of new 
immigrants that become sector specific, that is, if s/(1 - l) ‡ 1.   This condition is more 
likely to occur the higher is the fraction l of new immigrants with (mobile) domestic 
worker status.  If l is sufficiently large, the decline in export sector production arises 
because the immigration induced increase in the stock of domestic workers requires these 
workers to be absorbed mainly by the domestic labor intensive import-competing sector.   
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As the import-competing sector expands, it then draws capital from the export sector, 
reducing production of the export good.  
If instead s/(1 - l) < 1 then (12) can be negative or positive, and hence export 
sector output could either rise or fall with immigration.  To gain further insight, we can ask 
what conditions would make it more likely that production of the export good rises with 
immigration (as was the case when l = 0).  By inspecting (12) under the assumption that 
s/(1 - l) < 1, one can deduce that the smaller is the ratio s/(1 - l), the more likely is export 
production to rise with immigration (since this makes (12) more likely to be negative).   
This in turn requires that the new inflow of workers contains either a high fraction of 
workers who will become sector specific (large (1 - l)) or that sector specific workers are 
initially a relatively small fraction of total employment in the non-traded sector (small s).   
This suggests that countries with relatively small immigrant worker populations are more 
likely to experience an increase in export sector output due to immigration.   
Another condition that would make an increase in export production more likely 
relates to the relative sizes of the capital-labor ratios in the non-traded and import-
competing sectors.  Specifically, the smaller is the ratio kn/km, the more likely, other things 
equal, that (12) is negative, and hence the more likely that export sector output rises with 
immigration.  This follows since, the smaller is k n/km, the closer to unity is the term 
( ) ( ) 1- nm kk .  In turn, the closer is this term to unity, the more likely is  ( ) ( ) 1- nm kk  to 
exceed s/(1 – l), where we recall that the latter is now assumed to be less than one.  Thus, 
when s/(1 - l) < 1, the larger is the divergence in capital-labor usage between the non-
traded and import-competing sectors (i.e., the smaller is kn/km), the more likely that export 
sector output rises with immigration.  An alternative interpretation of this relationship is 
that, the smaller is kn/km , the smaller can be the share (1 - l) of sector specific workers in  
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any given inflow of new foreign workers to still have an increase in production of the 
export good.  
The preceding analysis of the effect of immigration on the output of the export 
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How production of the import-competing good responds to immigration is 















Comparison of (16) and (12) indicates an expected symmetry between these expressions.  
Like the case of export production, the sign of (16) depends in a complicated way on the 
relationship between the existing employment share of sector specific immigrants (s) and 
the share of sector specific immigrants in the new wave of immigrants (1 - l), as well as 
the relationship between the capital-labor ratios in the non-traded and export sectors.    
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We consider first the case for which the inflow of new foreign workers consists 
entirely of sector specific workers (i.e., l = 0).   In this case, determining the sign of (16) 











Since  ( ) 1-= nkndn ksaa  is the ratio of capital to domestic labor employed in the non-
traded sector, (17) is positive given our assumption that the export sector is more intensive 
than the non-traded services sector in capital relative to domestic labor.  Since (10) is then 
negative, production of the import-competing good falls if all new immigrants become 
specific to the non-traded sector.  This result, together with the previous result that 
production of the export good rises when l = 0, implies that trade will increase when all 
new immigrants become specific to the non-traded services sector.  This trade effect 
follows since, assuming demand unchanged, a fall in the output of the domestic import-
competing sector implies an increase in imports and, assuming balanced trade, also an 
increase in exports (which was anyway predicted when l = 0).  Hence, when all new 
immigrants become specific to the non-traded sector,  immigration and trade are 
complements.  It is important to note that this complementary relationship arises in our 
model without assuming, as does prior literature, that the internationally mobile factor is 
used intensively in the export sector (e.g., Markusen (1983)).  
Now consider the more general case for which 0 < l < 1, so that some of the new 
immigrants will have (mobile) domestic worker status.  Similar to the export sector 
analysis, the term  ( ) ( ) 1- nx kk  in  (17) is less than one since k n/kx  < 1, given our 
assumption that the export sector is more capital-intensive than the non-traded sector.  
Given the latter, (17) will be unambiguously negative, and hence production of the import-
competing good will unambiguously rise with immigration, if s/(1 – l) ‡  1.  From the  
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export sector analysis, we found that production of the export good unambiguously falls 
when s/(1 - l) ‡ 1.  Hence, in our model, trade and immigration are substitutes when the 
existing employment share of sector specific immigrants e xceeds the share of new 
immigrants that become sector specific, that is, when s/(1 - l) ‡  1.
 16  
We note that the possibility of a substitute relationship arises in our model because 
we have allowed a given inflow of migrants to contain a mixture of both sector specific 
and domestic status workers.
17 As found above, trade and immigration are unambiguously 
complements, in our model, if new immigrants consist entirely of sector specific workers.  
This underscores the importance of accounting, not only for the  characteristics of 
immigrants (e.g., skilled versus unskilled, legal versus illegal, etc.), but also for the sector 
and the nature (e.g. sector specific) of employment of each type of migrant when 
considering the effects of immigration on an economy. 
If instead s/(1 – l) < 1 then, like the case of export production, production of the 
import-competing good may rise or fall with immigration.  When s/(1 – l) < 1 one can 
deduce, by a reasoning similar to that done for the export good, the conditions under which 
production of the import-competing good is likely to fall.  In this regard, expression (16) is 
more likely to be positive, and hence production of the import-competing good more likely 
to fall the smaller is the ratio s/(1 – l).  Therefore, the smaller is the share of sector 
specific workers in total non-traded sector employment (s), or the larger is the fraction 
(1 - l) of new immigrants who will become sector specific, the more likely that production 
of the import competing good will fall with immigration.  Intuitively, the larger is the 
share of new foreign workers that become sector specific the less the inflow of new 
foreign workers represents an increase in the stock of mobile domestic workers, and hence 
the less likely i s the inflow of new foreign workers to contribute to an increase in 
production of the import-competing good.  From the export analysis we found that the  
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smaller is s/(1 – l) the more likely is export production to rise is immigration.  This, and 
the above analysis for the import-competing sector, suggests that the smaller is  s/(1 – l) 
the more likely are trade and immigration to be complements. 
Finally, expression (16) is also more likely to be positive, and hence production of 
the import-competing good more likely to fall, the smaller is the ratio kn/kx.   Thus, the 
larger is the capital-labor ratio in the export sector compared to that in the non-traded 
sector, the more likely is production of the import-competing good to fall with 
immigration.  The preceding discussion of output changes for the import-competing sector 
can be summarized as follows.  When 0 < l < 1 then  
(18) 
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The effect of immigration on production of the non-traded good is clear from (11), 
namely, production of the non-traded rises so long as the new inflow of workers contains 
at least some workers who will become specific to the non-traded sector, that is, as long as 
(1 - l) > 0.   Conversely, production of the non-traded good is unchanged if the new inflow 
of foreign workers consists entirely of workers with domestic worker status.
18  The output 
response in the non-traded sector can therefore be summarized as:   
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That production of the non-traded good rises with immigration was expected since 
any increase in the stock of immigrant workers must, since these workers are specific to 
the non-traded sector, raise the output of this sector in order to absorb the increased supply 
of these workers.  However, whether this output expansion in the non-traded sector comes 
at the expense of a reduction in output in the export sector or the import-competing sector 
depends on the share of sector specific immigrants in the new wave of immigration versus 
the existing employment share of sector specific immigrants in the non-traded sector.  As 
we have found, the higher is the share of sector specific workers in the new wave of 
immigrants, and the lower is the employment share of existing immigrants in the non-
traded sector, the more likely is immigration to raise output in the export sector and to 
lower output in the import competing sector, and hence to increase trade.
19  
Lastly, we have found that production in the export and import-competing sectors 
can either rise or fall when s/(1 – l) < 1.  While it is possible for production of both the 
export and import-competing good to fall, it is not possible that both sectors experience an 
increase in production since this would require an increase in the use of capital in all three 
sectors, which is not possible given that the stock of capital is fixed in our  model.
20  
Therefore, since production of the non-traded good must rise with any new inflow of 
sector specific immigrant workers, one (or both) of the traded goods sectors must contract.   
 
II.B  Partial Amnesty for Immigrant Workers 
In our model one could also think to examine the case of “partial amnesty” in 
which some fraction of existing sector specific immigrant workers gain domestic worker 
status and thus become mobile across all sectors (e.g., by issuing official work permits to 
illegal immigrants or by providing training that allows immigrants to assimilate into the  
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general pool of workers).   In the context of our model, it is clear that converting some 
sector specific immigrant workers into mobile domestic workers would have the same 
qualitative effect as an increase in the stock of domestic workers alone.  In order to absorb 
the increase in domestic workers the import sector would need to expand, the export sector 
would need to contract, and by implication, trade would be reduced.  Moreover, since a 
partial amnesty of the existing stock of immigrants entails a reduction in the number of 
sector specific immigrant workers, the output of the non-traded good must fall. 
 
III.  Trade Liberalization and Immigration  
In this section, we briefly consider the implications of our model for the question 
of whether a move by a country toward freer trade would enhance or reduce incentives to 
migrate to that country.  An assumption of this analysis is that migration flows respond to 
international wage differentials.  Given this, we consider the effect that a fall in the 
domestic price of the import-competing good, due to the removal of a tariff imposed on 
imports of this good, has on factor prices.
21  The direction of these factor price changes, 
and in particular the change in the wage of sector specific immigrants, then indicates 
whether trade liberalization will increase or reduce incentives for immigration.  
Denote the prices of goods by Pj (j = x, m, or n), denote “r” as the rental return to 
one unit of capital, “w” as the wage of immigrant labor, and “u” the wage of domestic 


















To examine how an exogenous change in an output price would affect input prices 






























Treating the output prices and the immigrant wage (w) as parametric, each of these 
equations (i.e., factor price frontiers) can be graphed as shown in Figure 2.  Each curve 
indicates, for given values of the output prices and immigrant wage, the values of r and u 
compatible with zero profits in each sector.  As shown in Figure 2, the point where these 
three curves intersect is the economy-wide zero profit equilibrium.  We note that in Figure 
2 the mm curve is drawn steeper than the xx curve to reflect our assumption that the export 
sector is capital-intensive relative to the import-competing sector.  The implication of this 
assumption for the effect of an output price change on inputs prices will be further 
discussed below. 
Now consider the effect of imposing a import tariff that raises the domestic price of 
the import-competing good.  Graphically, this price change shifts the mm curve up and to 
the right as shown by the curve labeled m¢m¢ in Figure 3.  Since the price of exports is 
fixed on world markets (small country assumption), the xx curve is also fixed.  Therefore, 
to restore the economy-wide zero profit equilibrium, the nn curve must shift until it 
intersects the xx curve at the same point where the m¢m¢ curve now intersects the xx curve.  
Since the price of the non-traded good is also fixed, the shift in curve nn is accomplished 
by a fall in the wage of immigrant workers (w).  This fall in the immigrant wage leads to  
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the new nn curve labeled n¢n¢.  Therefore, in the context of our model, an import tariff 
raises the wage of domestic workers but lowers the return to capital and the wage of sector 
specific immigrant workers. 
By reversing the above analysis, we conclude that tariff removal raises the return to 
capital and the wage of sector specific immigrant workers but lowers the wage of domestic 
(and domestic status immigrant) workers.  Hence, if immigration responds to a wage 
differential, a move toward freer trade would increase the incentives for sector specific 
type workers to immigrate but lower the incentive to immigrate for workers who would 
have domestic worker status.  Phased in terms of “legal” versus “illegal” immigrants, trade 
liberalization would create incentives for illegal immigration and create disincentives for 
legal immigration in our model.  
As can be seen in Figure  3, the effect of the tariff on the wage of immigrant 
workers depends on whether the mm curve is flatter or steeper than the xx curve.  We have 
drawn the mm curve steeper than the xx curve since we assume the export sector is more 
capital-intensive than the import-competing sector.  However, if the reverse were true, 
then the effect of the tariff on the wage of immigrant workers would be opposite that found 
above.  Hence, if the import-competing sector is more capital-intensive than the export 
sector, then a move toward freer trade would raise the wage of domestic workers and 
lower the wage of sector specific immigrant workers, and hence increase the incentive for 
sector specific type of worker to emigrate.   
The preceding results suggest that, if comparative advantages follow the 
Heckscher-Ohlin prediction, the relationship between immigration and trade liberalization 
would be different for capital abundant and labor abundant countries.  A capital abundant 
country that alone pursues freer trade in goods would be expected to experience an inflow 
of sector specific type workers and an outflow of domestic workers.  Conversely, a labor  
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abundant country that alone pursues freer trade in goods would experience an outflow of 
sector specific type workers and an inflow of domestic workers.  The case in which both 
capital and labor abundant countries liberalize is problematic in the context of the present 
model since one country’s domestic type workers may become the other country’s sector 
specific type worker.  Clearly, proper analysis of this case requires, at a minimum, a two-
country model.  
Linking (informally) these results to the previous analysis of immigration and trade 
we conjecture that, for capital abundant countries, unilateral trade liberalization could 
enhance trade not only by reducing barriers to trade in goods but also because these 
countries are more likely to experience an inflow of foreign workers who become 
employed in the non-traded sector.  As we found, the higher is the fraction of immigrants 
that become sector specific, the more likely is immigration to increase exports and to 
reduce import-competing production, and therefore, to enhance the pro-trade effects of 
trade liberalization.  
 
IV.  Empirical Analysis 
In this section, we explore empirically the relationships between immigration, the 
output of non-traded goods (services), and trade (exports).  Our theoretical model suggests 
that, to the extent immigrants are specific to the non-traded sector, immigration will be 
associated with an increase in the output of non-traded goods.  For exports, the effect of 
immigration depends on the characteristics of new immigrants and the share of immigrants 
already working in the non-traded sectors of an economy.  Our empirical analysis of 
exports in relation to immigration is therefore intended to identify whether the actual 
relationship between exports and immigration is positive or negative, and consequently 
whether the data reveal immigration and exports to be complements or substitutes.  
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IV.A  Model Specification 
We estimate two sets of relationships, one between exports and immigration and 
one between the output of services and immigration.  In each case, we use GDP per capita 
as a control for differences in country wealth and size and, in the case of services output, 
also for the known relationship between services output and GDP per capita.
 22  We further 
include the square of GDP per capita to allow for the possibility of a nonlinear relationship 
between each dependent variable and GDP per capita. 
Our data sample includes two countries (Germany and Switzerland) that have 
“guest worker” programs.  Such programs may direct a large fraction of immigrant 
employment into traded goods sectors and, by definition, skews the mix of immigrants 
toward those who will have, in the terminology of our theoretical model, “domestic-
worker” status.  To control for this, we interact our immigration variable with a dummy for 
these guest-worker countries. Given the above, the relationships to be estimated takes the 
form : 
(23)  Yit = b0 + b1 GW ￿ b2￿ Immigration it-1  + b3￿ (GW￿Immigrationit-1)   
+ b4￿GDP per capita it  + b5￿(GDP per capita it)
2
 +  eit. 
The variable Yit is either exports or services output in country i at time t.  We use lagged 
immigration since we expect there to be a lagged effect between the time a migrant arrives 
and the subsequent impact on trade and services output.   The variable GW is the dummy 
variable for guest-worker countries.  The variable “GW￿Immigration” is the interaction 
variable between the guest-worker country dummy and lagged immigration.   
Our empirical analysis can be thought to be uncovering the sign of a Rybcznyksi 
effect associated with a change in a country’s  stock of workers. This suggests that an 
appropriate specification to estimate would involve the level of output in relation to the  
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stock of immigrant workers.  However, lacking reliable data on immigrant stocks, and for 
statistical reasons, we instead estimate (23) using the change (first difference) in each 
dependent variable and the GDP per capita controls.
 23 
We estimate specification (23) using two different measures of the immigration 
variable, total immigration and net immigration (i.e., immigration minus emigration).  We 
prefer the total immigration variable for two reasons.  First, many countries in our sample 
do not report emigration, so limiting ourselves to net immigration i nvolves a loss in 
degrees of freedom.  Second, we suspect that, like data on imports and exports of goods, 
the data on inflows (immigration) are likely to be more accurate than the data on outflows 
(emigration).  The net immigration variable may therefore be subject to measurement 
error.  
In summary, our regression model specifies the annual change in either exports or 
services output in relation to the inflow of migrants lagged one year, an interaction 
variable between lagged immigration and a dummy for guest-worker program countries, 
the annual change in GDP per capita, and the square of the annual change in GDP per 
capita.   
With respect to exports, we use specification (23) to examine total exports of goods 
and services as well as the two components of this variable - exports of goods and exports 
of services.  Our theoretical model indicates that the relationship between exports and 
immigration depends on the fraction of new immigrants that become sector specific versus 
the share of sector specific immigrants already working in the non-traded services sector, 
as well as the relative use of capital and labor in the export and import-competing 
sectors.
24   The higher is the share of new immigrants who will work in the non-traded 
sector, the more likely is there to be a positive relationship between exports and 
immigration.  We note that our expectation of a positive relationship between exports and  
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immigration applies primarily to exports of goods.  Our theoretical results do not have 
clear implications for traded services, and hence  the  sign of the coefficient on  lagged 
immigration for services exports could be positive or negative.   
With respect to services output, the theoretical model predicts that immigration will 
unambiguously raise output of non-traded goods.  We therefore expect a positive 
relationship between services output and immigration.  Since we are only interested in that 
part of services likely to be non-traded, we limit our focus to data on non-financial services, 
which is further broken down into two categories: “wholesale/retail non-financial services” 
and “other non-financial services.”    
  
IV.B  Data 
Annual data on total inflows and outflows of migrants for the period 1980-2001 
were taken from the OECD’s Trends in International Migration Database (OECD (2002)).  
The migration data refer to permanent flows and therefore exclude tourists, etc.  For the 
time period studied, data were available in various years for fourteen OECD countries: 
Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Japan, Luxembourg, the 
Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, the UK, and the US.  Australia, Canada, 
France, the UK, and the US do not report outflows. 
Data on gross domestic product, population, exports of goods and services, and the 
output (value added) of “wholesale/retail non-financial services” and “other non-financial 
services” were taken from the OECD National Accounts database.  The sector “other non-
financial services” includes non-business services such as public administration and health 
care.
25  The “wholesale/retail non-financial services” sector encompasses wholesale and 
retail trade as well as hotel, restaurant, and transportation activities.  Total services is  
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calculated as the sum of the outputs of these two service categories.  The data on GDP, 
exports, and services output are measured in 1995 US dollars.
26   
Since we have panel data, we test for group and time interaction effects.  In 
addition, we perform standard tests for cross-sectional correlation, serial correlation in the 
panel, and groupwise heteroscedasticity.  These tests indicated first order autocorrelation 
in the levels of both services output and exports.  We correct for these AR1 processes by 
using first differences in the respective data.
27  Tests for groupwise heteroscedasticity in 
the residuals using the modified Wald statistic indicated its presence.  In addition, the 
Breusch-Pagan Lagrange Multiplier (LM) test for independence of the errors across panels 
indicated that the errors are not independent but are correlated across countries.   
Because we have an unbalanced panel, we are limited in our choice of corrective 
estimation techniques.  We therefore use the Prais-Winsten transformation to obtain panel-
corrected standard errors to account for groupwise heteroscedasticity.  We further specify 
that the covariance matrix is calculated using all available information.
28  
 
IV.C  Results 
Tables 2a, 2b and 2c presents summary statistics for the data samples used to 
estimate specification  (23) for services output, goods and services exports, and goods 
exports and services exports separately when total immigration is used as the immigration 
variable.  Tables 3a, 3b and 3c present the corresponding information for each sample 
when net immigration is used as the immigration variable. The simple correlation between 
the annual change in services output and lagged immigration is 0.54; the correlation 
between the annual change in goods and services exports and lagged immigration is 0.44.  
The corresponding correlations for net immigration are 0.11 for total services output and 
0.16 for exports of goods and services.  
  30
 
IV.C.1 Results for Services Output 
The results of estimating specification (23) for the each of the three categories of 
services output are reported in  Table  4.  For the regressions using total immigration 
(columns 1-3 in Table 4) the coefficient on lagged immigration is positive and highly 
significant in all cases, consistent with the prediction of the theoretical model.  For the 
regressions that use net immigration (columns 4-6 in Table 4), the coefficient on lagged 
immigration is positive and significant at least at the 5% level for Total Services and Other 
Services, and is positive and significant at the 10% level for Wholesale Services.  These 
results are also consistent with our model’s prediction that non-traded goods output rises 
with the level of immigration.   
The coefficient on the interaction between the dummy for guest-worker countries 
and total immigration (columns 1-3 in Table 4) is negative and highly significant for each 
of the three categories of services output.  The coefficient on this interaction variable when 
net immigration is used (columns 4 -6 in  Table  4) are similarly negative a nd highly 
significant except for Wholesale Services.   These results suggest that a guest worker 
program, which skews the mix of immigrants toward domestic-status type workers, serves 
to offset the expansionary effects of immigration on services output – a result consistent 
with our theoretical model.  To determine if this offset is complete, we tested the 
hypothesis that the sum of the immigration coefficient and the guest worker interaction 
coefficient is negative.  When total immigration is used as the immigration variable, the 
hypothesis was rejected at the 5% level for all three categories of services, indicating that 
the negative effect of guest worker programs is not strong enough to completely offset the 
generally positive effect of immigration.   This finding also holds, except for Wholesale 
Services, when net immigration is used as the immigration variable; the hypothesis was  
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rejected at the 5% level for Total Services and Other Services but can be rejected only at 
the 14% level for Wholesale Services.     
As expected, the coefficient on per capita GDP is positive and significant in all 
cases except for “Other Services” when net immigration is used as the immigration 
variable.  In addition, except again for “Other Services” when net immigration is used as 
the immigration variable, the coefficient on squared GDP per capita is negative and 
significant.  These results indicate a non-linear relationship with respect to changes in 
services output: changes in GDP per capita have an increasing but diminishing marginal 
effect on the growth of services output.   
 
IV.C.2 Results for Exports  
The results of estimating  (23) for each of the three categories of exports are 
reported in Table 5.  The coefficient on immigration is positive and highly significant in all 
cases except for Exports of Goods and Services when net immigration is used as the 
immigration variable.  As noted earlier, out primary interest is the results for goods 
exports, and in this respect the results are again consistent with the predictions of our 
model:  exports of goods are positively and significantly associated with higher levels of 
immigration. 
As with the services output regressions, the coefficient on the guest-worker 
interaction variable is negative and significant when total immigration is used as the 
immigration variable (columns 1-3 in Table 5) and is negative and significant only in the 
Goods Exports and Services Exports regressions when net immigration is used as the 
immigration variable (columns 4-6 in Table 5). 
Given the negative coefficient for the guest worker interaction variable, we again 
tested, for each model, the hypothesis that the sum of the immigration coefficient and the  
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guest worker interaction coefficient is negative. When net immigration is the dependent 
variable we failed to reject the hypothesis in all cases, meaning that the negative effects of 
targeting domestic-status type immigrants creates a substitute relationship between exports 
and immigration in guest worker program countries.  However, this conclusion is reversed 
when total immigration is used as the dependent variable: the hypothesis that the sum of 
the coefficients is negative was rejected for both goods exports and for exports of goods 
and services.  For services exports, the hypothesis could be rejected only at the 12% level. 
The difference in results for the two measures of the level immigration creates uncertainty 
about the true effect.  The only conclusion that seems possible at this stage is that, for 
countries with guest worker programs, the likelihood that exports and immigration are 
substitutes is increased.  This finding is consistent with the predictions of our theoretical 
model.  
For the exports regressions, the coefficient on per capita GDP is positive and 
highly significant in all cases.  In addition, in all cases the coefficient on squared GDP per 
capita is negative and highly significant.  Like the case for services output, this indicates a 
non-linear relationship with respect to changes in exports: changes in GDP per capita have 
an increasing but diminishing marginal effect on the growth of exports.    
 
V.  Conclusion 
This paper has presented a model of an economy with three factors of production, 
two traded goods and one non-traded good.  The purpose of the model was to discern the 
output and trade effects associated with immigration when the employment of some 
immigrant labor is restricted to the non-traded g oods sector.  Two empirical facts 
regarding immigrant labor motivated the structure of our model.  First, a significant 
fraction of immigrant employment is concentrated in sectors whose output is, to a large  
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extent, not internationally traded (services).  Second, some immigrants face significant and 
persistent barriers to mobility across sectors within their host country.
29   In constructing a 
model that takes account of these aspects of immigrant employment, we have 
demonstrated that where immigrants work, and the characteristics of their employment, 
does have important implications for the effects of immigration on output and trade.  
Moreover, by allowing that a given inflow of new immigrants contains a heterogeneous 
mixture of foreign workers, either a complementary or a substitute relationship between 
trade and immigration can emerge in our model.  Thus, in contrast to prior literature that 
has modeled an internationally mobile but domestically sector-specific factor, a 
complementary (substitute) relationship can arise in our model without assuming that the 
internationally mobile factor is used intensively in the export (import-competing) sector.  
Empirical examination of the predictions of our model in a panel of OECD 
countries indicated that, consistent with our model, the output of services rises with the 
level of immigration.  In addition, we found that trade (exports) and immigration are 
complements. We also found that, consistent with our model, this complementary 
relationship between trade and immigration is reduced, and could be reversed, by 
immigration policies, such as guest-worker programs, that target domestic-status type 
immigrants and which may direct the employment of such immigrants into traded goods 
sectors.  
Our theoretical model indicates t hat the higher is the share of sector specific 
immigrants among new immigrants, and the lower the employment share of existing 
immigrants in the non-traded sector, the more likely that immigration will increase output 
in the export sector and decrease output in the import competing sector, and hence lead to 
increased trade.  Therefore, the higher is the fraction of new immigrants that become 
employed in the non-traded sector, the more likely are trade and immigration to be  
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complements.  One policy implication of this relationship is that countries for whom 
immigrant workers are presently a small share of non-traded sector employment are more 
likely to experience an increase in export sector output consequent to immigration, under 
the caveat that immigration  policy does not discourage the type of (sector specific) 
immigrants likely to become employed in non-traded goods sectors.  
Not only do we have empirical confirmation of our model, our empirical results go 
one step further to suggest that it not only matters where immigrants become employed, 
but it also matters from what country migrants arrive.  Workers arriving from a country 
where they are more likely to integrate into the domestic labor pool, or to have attained the 
skills to work in traded goods sectors, will reduce the positive effects on non-traded goods 
output and may result in trade and immigration being substitutes.  In this regard, our model 
has implications for targeted immigration policies, such as those that encourage high-
skilled labor immigration. To the extent that our results hold, targeting only high-skilled 
workers may remove the potential for the complementary pro-trade benefit that would 
arise from the employment of sector specific immigrants in non-traded goods sectors.  
Our model suggests that integrating immigrants into the general pool of domestic 
workers would shift production from export to import-competing sectors and would 
therefore reduce trade.  However, this does mean that a country should limit rather than 
encourage the integration of immigrant workers into its economy since these sectoral 
output changes say nothing about national welfare, which may be significantly enhanced 
by such integration, particularly when social dimensions are considered.  
In the context of our theoretical model we also examined the effect of trade 
liberalization on the incentives for workers to migrate.  We found that the incentives for 
migration following trade liberalization differed between capital abundant and labor 
abundant countries.  In particular, for capital abundant countries, a movement toward freer  
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trade in goods creates an incentive to immigrate only for workers likely to become specific 
to the country’s non-traded goods sector.  This implies that for capital abundant countries, 
the pro-trade effect of trade liberalization may be enhanced by the complementary 
relationship between trade and immigration found when most new migrants become 
specific to the non-traded good sector.  While we did not empirically examine this 
predicted relationship b etween trade liberalization and migration flows, the general 
empirical support for our theoretical model suggests that such effects may also be 
empirically valid. 
We conclude with some suggested interpretations, and some possible extensions, of 
our model.  First, it is a simple matter to reinterpret the immigrants who become sector 
specific as low-skilled workers and those who have domestic-worker status as high-skilled.  
Doing so allows one to then interpret our findings in this context.  In line with this theme, 
one could also re-label capital in our model to be high-skilled labor, so that exports are 
skilled-labor intensive.  This extension would admit a richer analysis of the impact of 
immigration since any given inflow of migrants could then contain both high-skilled and 
low-skilled workers, where the latter would also be a mixture of sector specific low-skilled 
workers and domestic-status low-skilled workers.  Since high-skilled labor is intensive in 
the export sector, the possibility of a complementary relationship between trade and 
immigration may then be enhanced, although, as in the present model, this would likely 
depend on the relative mix of each type of worker in a given inflow of new migrants. 
Lastly, if labor were differentiated by skill level, one might also treat capital as 
internationally mobile.  This would allow one to explore possible complementarity 
between capital and labor flows.  As suggested by the above, the model developed here 
suggests a rich set of extensions that can offer more precise insights into the economic 




1 Welfare effects of immigration have also been considered (e.g., Srinivasan (1983)).  See 
Borjas (1994, 1995) for a review of the economic benefits of immigration. 
2 For an overview of theories relating to international migration, see Massey, et al. (1993).  
For a summary of the wage effects of immigration see Friedberg and Hunt (1995). 
3 Harris and Todaro (1970) model rural to urban migration in which a wage differential is 
the main incentive for migration.  However, their model also takes into account 
characteristics of both rural and the urban sector labor markets and hence much of the 
literature based on their model also considers the role of unemployment in urban areas. 
The Harris-Todaro model has been successful empirically and is often the basis for 
considering wage differentials and labor market characteristics as key determinants of 
migration both within and between countries. 
4 The distinction between the Mundell (1957) and Markusen (1983) interpretation of when 
trade and factor flows are substitutes or complements seems important in an empirical 
context.  The Markusen view asks whether an increased inflow of a factor raises or reduces 
trade.  Empirically, this suggests models that relate trade flows to factor flows.  The 
Mundell view asks whether increases in goods trade move factor prices toward equality.  
Empirically, this suggests models that relate factor price differences to trade flows.  
5 Migration News, http://migration.ucdavis.edu/mn/comments.php?id=2698_0_10_0 
6 New York Times, May 6, 2004.  “4-Hour Trek Across New York for 4 Hours of Work, 
and $28.” 
7 The concentration of foreign w orkers in services often mirrors the pattern of native 
worker employment in services, reflecting the increased importance of services in most 
OECD countries. Regardless, the concentration of foreign workers in services is, by itself,  
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what is relevant here. Moreover, within some service sectors (e.g., domestic household 
services) the employment of foreign workers is much more concentrated than that of 
native workers. 
8 A number of studies examine the welfare implications of tariffs, etc, in models with non-
traded goods and internationally mobile factors (e.g., Michael (1992).  However, none of 
these studies address the issue of whether trade and factor flows are substitutes or 
complements. 
9 In this paper, whether trade and immigration are substitutes or complements is analyzed 
in the sense of Markusen (1983): if immigration raises (reduces) trade then trade and 
immigration are complements (substitutes). 
10 A large body of literature examines the effect of a country’s stage of development on 
migration decisions (e.g., Fiani and Venturini (1993)).  In the migration literature, Hatton 
and Williamson (2002) identify economic and demographic fundamentals leading to 
migration.  Schiff (1996) contends that whether trade and migration are substitutes or 
complements depends fundamentally on migration costs, credit constraints and the 
potential income in the receiving country.  These income and incentive effects for 
migration are outside the scope of our model. 
11 The term “immigrant labor” refers to those prior immigrants that became specific to the 
non-traded good sector. 
12 This ordering implicitly assumes that immigrant workers are less productive than 
domestic workers in the non-traded sector, that is, a in > a dn.  This assumption does not 
affect the qualitative conclusions reached. 
13 One could label new immigrants with domestic worker status as “legal” immigrants and 
those without domestic worker status as “illegal” immigrants.  However, one can also  
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think of immigrants with domestic worker status as those who can easily be absorbed into 
the economy because, for example, they are highly skilled or have a good command of the 
host nation’s language. 
14 Without loss of generality we assume I = 1. 
15 This is like the case of examining only an increase in illegal immigrants, as in Djajic 
(1995). 
16 This implies that trade and immigration will be substitutes if no domestic workers are 
employed in the non-traded sector.  This follows since the fraction of sector specific 
workers in the non-traded sector (s) would then equal unity, and hence the condition for 
substitutability between trade and immigration, s/(1 – l) ‡ 1, is satisfied. 
17 Again, this contrasts with prior work where a substitute relationship is due to the 
assumption that the internationally mobile factor is intensive in, or specific to, the import-
competing sector. 
18 That production does not change in sectors that employ a specific factor when there is a 
rise only in the supply of a mobile factor is a feature of all specific factor models. This 
arises because any attempt to employ additional units of the mobile factor in such sectors 
is constrained by the unaltered supply of the specific factor.  Instead, all output adjustment 
must takes place in those sectors that employ only mobile factors of production. 
19 This suggests that illegal immigration is more likely to increase trade, and legal 
immigration m ore likely to reduce trade, since illegal immigrants as less likely to be 
domestically mobile across sectors. 
20 This suggests the possibility that, with internationally mobile capital, this “capital 
shortage” might be relieved by an inflow of foreign capital which suggests one channel by 
which immigration and capital movements could be complementary.  If so, it also suggests  
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that trade could be found to be complementary with both immigration and international 
capital movements, as suggested in Wong (1988).  
21 Our analysis therefore considers only the Stolper-Samuelson effects implied by our 
model. 
22 Across countries, GDP per capita is also highly correlated with the stock of capital per 
worker.  Hence, GDP per capita can also be seen as a proxy of national capital-labor ratios. 
23 As described in the data section, tests detect the presence of AR1correlation for both 
services and exports.  Therefore, we correctly need to first difference before estimation. 
24 To illustrate, data on recent (legal) immigrants to England indicates that about 10% 
(= (1 - l)) take employment in non-traded service sectors. The data also indicate that the 
share of immigrants in total service sector employment is 7.8%.  These data imply that 
s/(1 – l) =.078/.1 = 0.78.  Since si /(1 – l) < 1, export and import-competing production 
may rise or fall with immigration.  Since England experiences significant illegal 
immigration the actual fraction of new immigrants that take sector-specific employment 
could be much higher – which strengthens the case for a decline in import-competing 
production and an increase in export production.  To say more we would need to know the 
capital-labor ratio in services and import-competing production, since export production 
rises when  ( ) (1)1 l -<- nm skk .  Since s/(1 – l) = 0.78 we require that kn < 0.22 km (i.e., 
the services capital-labor ratio would need to be less than about 1/5 the capital-labor ratio 
in the import-competing sector) if export production is to rise with immigration. 
25 Given the high social spending in these areas by some of the countries in the panel, a 




26 Most countries needed to be rebased from their domestic currency to 1995 US dollars. 
The exchange rates used were taken from the International Monetary Fund’s “International 
Financial Statistics.” 
27 In addition, we have already discussed the appropriateness of this transformation with 
respect to our theoretical model. 
28 All estimations were performed using STATA’s “xtpcse” routine with the “pairwise” 
option enabled. 
29 The persistence of such immobility suggests that, unlike past analyses of models that 
involve a sector specific factor, a separate short-run versus long-run analysis of our model 
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Figure 2.  Zero Profit Equilibrium With Three Goods 
 
 












Figure  3.  Effect of Import Tariff on Factor Prices When Export  Production is 
Capital-Intensive Relative to Import-Competing Production 
 
 


















Table 1.  Stock of immigrants as a percent of total population, 1986 and 2000 
 
  1986  2000  Average Annual 
Percent Change 
France  6.18  5.39  -1.0% 
Belgium  8.65  8.41  -0.2% 
Netherlands  3.90  4.19  0.5% 
Sweden  4.67  5.38  1.0% 
Canada   15.4  17.4  1.3% 
Switzerland  14.54  19.27  2.0% 
UK  3.20  4.33  2.2% 
Luxembourg  26.41  37.56  2.5% 
Germany  5.81  8.88  3.1% 
Norway  2.62  4.10  3.3% 
Japan  0.71  1.33  4.6% 
Denmark  2.51  4.84  4.8% 
US   6.2  9.3  5.0% 
Austria 
  4.3  9.1  11.2% 
Italy   1.0  2.2  12.0% 
 
Note: for the US and Canada the figures are foreign born population as a percentage of total population.  For 
Austria, Canada, Italy, and the US the year 2000 figures are for 1997.  
 
Source: Author’s calculations using data from OECD (2002) - SOPEMI .  
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Table 2a.   Summary statistics, sample for services output using total immigration 








Total Services   14927.0  29521.2  1       
Other Services  5436.6  9826.8  0.80  1     
Wholesale Services  9490.4  22442.4  0.96  0.61  1   
Lagged Immigration  185.3  274.2  0.54  0.51  0.48  1 
GDP per Capita  21526.6  4286.5  0.23  0.11  0.24  0.17 
observations = 249, 1980-2000, Switzerland, who does not report services, is excluded.  
 
Table 2b.  Summary statistics, sample for exports of goods and services using total 
immigration 




Goods and Services Exports  8965.5  15767.8  1   
Lagged Immigration  177.6  265.3  0.44  1 
GDP per Capita  21816.6  4265.6  0.13  0.14 
observations = 269, 1980-2000, All 14 countries are included. 
 
Table 2c.  Summary statistics, sample for goods exports and services exports using 
total immigration 






Goods Exports  8396.7  14322.5  1     
Services Exports  2212.7  3913.3  0.74  1   
Lagged Immigration  221.9  305.5  0.40  0.48  1 
GDP per Capita  22318.3  4629.7  0.11  0.19  0.11 
observations = 183, 1980-2000, Belgium, Japan, and Norway do not report the sub-categories for exports of  
goods and services and are therefore excluded.    
  50
Table 3a. Summary statistics, sample for services output using net immigration 








Total Services   9478.3  19774.3  1       
Other Services  4198.1  8741.7  0.80  1     
Wholesale Services  5280.0  13758.7  0.93  0.52  1   
Lagged Net Immigration  41.6  86.7  0.11  0.12  0.08  1 
GDP per Capita  498.5  504.5  0.06  -0.03  0.10  -0.13 
observations = 159, 1980-2000, Australia, Canada, France, UK, USA do not report outflows of migrants. 
Switzerland does not report services. 
 
Table 3b. Summary statistics, sample for exports of goods and services using net 
immigration 




Goods and Services Exports  6453.6  11492.8  1   
Lagged Net Immigration  39.2  82.0  0.16  1 
GDP per Capita  465.3  507.5  0.17  -0.11 
observations = 179, 1980-2000, Australia, Canada, France, UK, USA do not report outflows of migrants.  
All 14 countries reporting Exports of Goods and Services. 
 
Table 3c. Summary statistics, sample for goods exports and services exports using net 
immigration 






Goods Exports  5967.6  10788.5  1     
Services Exports  1380.0  2242.5  0.45  1   
Lagged Net Immigration  57.2  108.8  0.15  0.25  1 
GDP per Capita  519.0  609.8  0.03  0.17  -0.14 
observations = 93, 1980-2000.  Belgium, Japan, and Norway do not report the sub-categories for goods 
exports  and services exports.  S everal other countries have missing sub-category data for the 1980s. 
Australia, Canada, France, UK, USA do not report outflows of migrants.  
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Table  4. Services output regressions for lagged total immigration and lagged net 
immigration  
Variable  Total Immigration   Net Immigration 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 































































































R-Squared  0.51  0.39  0.44  0.09  0.06  0.08 
Wald statistic  58.07  59.64  54.16  29.78  30.34  28.26 
Observations  249  249  249  159  159  159 
Countries  13  13  13  10  10  10 
 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
Notes:    Standard errors in brackets.  
Immigration is lagged one period (year). 
Services is calculated as the total of wholesale, retail trade, and other non-financial services. 
Dependent and GDP per capita variables are first differenced and measured in 1995 US dollars.     





Table 5.   Export regressions for lagged total immigration and lagged net immigration 
 
Variable  Total Immigration   Net Immigration 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 






























































































R-Squared  0.34  0.29  0.40  0.19  0.23  0.26 
Wald Statistic  51.39  32.68  48.54  49.75  35  42.68 
Observations  269  183  183  179  93  93 
Countries  14  11  11  11  8  8 
 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
Notes:  Standard errors in brackets. 
Immigration is lagged one period (year).   
Dependent and GDP per capita variables are first differenced and measured in 1995 US dollars.   
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